



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



APR 21 2001

Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

In accordance with section 1232 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, I am hereby submitting this report on the Sharing and Exchange of Ballistic Missile Launch Warning Data. Section 1232 provides that information shall be submitted on current and planned activities of the Department of Defense with respect to the sharing and exchange with other countries of early warning data concerning ballistic missile launches. The report also is to include an assessment of the benefits and risks of sharing such data with other countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

Operational Objective of Shared Early Warning (SEW)

The overall operational objective of Shared Early Warning (SEW) activities with our allies and friends, as well as Russia, is the continuous exchange of missile early warning information derived from U.S. missile early warning sensors, and, when available, from the sensors of the SEW partner. Information on missile launches is provided on a near real-time basis and is approximately the same quality and timeliness as that which would be provided to U.S. forces if co-located.

Benefits

For SEW with allies and friends, the underlying principle is regional stability. SEW arrangements with allies and friends not only demonstrate U.S. commitment to their security, but they also:

- Enhance awareness of the missile threat,
- Support active Theater Missile Defense (TMD), if available, and
- Support passive TMD and civil defense.

With respect to sharing early warning information with Russia (through a Joint Data Exchange Center or "JDEC" to be located in a Moscow suburb), the underlying principle is strategic stability.

- The JDEC will be the first permanent joint operation in the strategic arena involving U.S. and Russian military personnel.

- While the possibility of a missile launch caused by a false warning of an attack is extremely low, U.S. – Russia SEW takes into account the need further to minimize the consequences of a false missile attack warning and to prevent the possibility of a missile launch caused by such false warning.

Risks

The risks of SEW to the United States are considered minimal in that information on launches provided to our allies and to Russia is not classified at the time it is communicated; however, the information is treated as sensitive and is encrypted to protect its integrity.

- As information from current U.S. missile early warning systems improves over time, among other things through better processing, qualitative upgrades to SEW would be subject to country-by-country foreign disclosure clearance.
- In addition, provision of data from future advanced sensors (e.g., the Space-Based Infrared System) will require separate policy, and possibly arms control compliance, decisions.

U.S. SEW with Allies and Friends

U.S. SEW arrangements with allies and friends are guided by various bilateral and, in the case of NATO, multilateral agreements dating back to 1996. SEW cost-sharing arrangements vary by country.

- Current SEW partners include NATO, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Australia.
- Planned future SEW partners include members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and our other Arab security partners. (SEW offers were made by Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1996 and Secretary of Defense William Cohen in 1999 and have been accepted by a number of these countries.) The timetable for the implementation of SEW with these Middle East states varies; implementation is imminent for some states while it may be many months from now for others.

SEW Operational Parameters for Allies and friends

What is considered a “reportable” launch varies by country in accordance with the specific agreement the United States has made with it. For any reportable missile launch, the following information is provided: generic missile type (e.g., Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile), launch location and time, launch azimuth, impact area and time (if known), and whether the event is a single or multiple launch.

- For allies and friends, only theater class ballistic missiles are reported (i.e., no reporting of launches of strategic missiles or space launch vehicles), and
- Reporting is constrained geographically by a reportable region (e.g., report all launches within a specified distance from the border of a country or region, regardless of predicted impact point); or it is constrained by limiting reporting

to all launches that occur within the border of certain specified countries, regardless of predicted impact point.

Data on launches is provided to national command centers and/or other sites designated by the receiving country. No U.S. personnel are required to be present at the receiving site.

U.S. - Russia SEW

Our potential SEW partnership with Russia is guided by the *Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches* signed on June 4, 2000, in Moscow by Presidents Clinton and Putin. (Note: Due to still-to-be-resolved issues between the United States and Russia concerning exemption from taxes and liabilities, we have yet to initiate work in Moscow on the JDEC.) Implementing this MOA will establish the JDEC in Moscow. Start-up, as well as operations and maintenance costs, are to be shared equally. JDEC cost-issues are covered by a separate report to your committee.

Operational Concept for SEW with Russia

In accordance with the MOA, if the JDEC becomes operational:

- It will receive near-real time information on missile launches derived from U.S. and Russian missile early warning sensors. U.S. and Russian information is to be displayed on side-by-side U.S. and Russian monitors (i.e., the information is not electronically fused), and
- It will be jointly staffed around the clock, seven days a week, with U.S. and Russian military personnel.

The operational parameters of the information provided to Russia on each missile launch (e.g., location and time of launch) are the same as cited above for allies and friends. For Russia, the *types* of launches (e.g., ICBMs, theater ballistic missiles, etc.) reported under SEW will be phased in per the MOA. There are also geographic constraints on which launches are to be reported. In general, the data to be reported will be phased as follows:

- Phase I: U.S. and Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, SLVs.
- Phase II: Phase I + U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles with a range greater than 1500 km. In this context, ballistic missiles include sounding rockets and research rockets with a range of greater than 1500 km or an altitude of greater than 500 km.
- Phase III: Phase II + third party launches with a range greater than 500 km, in the direction of either party. In addition, launches that a party believes could create an ambiguous situation leading to possible misinterpretation by the other party may be reported.


The intention is to move to the final phase with reasonable dispatch.

Conclusion

It is the Department's assessment that its overall experience in sharing early warning data on ballistic missile launches with allies and friends has met expectations and has helped further U.S. national security goals.

A similar letter has been sent to the Ranking Minority Member of your Committee and to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Paul Wolfowitz". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal line extending from the end.